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Non-technical Summary 
This paper gives an overview of the German Social Long-term Care Insurance (Soziale 
Pflegeversicherung, SLTCI). In the current state, Germany provides a universal, non means-
tested contribution-financed social insurance for long-term care. This insurance should 
partially cover the care needs of the benefit claimants. Similar to the other social insurances in 
Germany, it is organized as a pay-as-you-go system. The benefit scheme allows for some 
flexibility in the provision of services due to recognition of different levels of care 
dependency and there are different types of benefits available; types of benefits comprise, 
e.g., cash allowances and benefits in-kind for home care, and financial support for 
institutional care. Today, most claimants apply for cash allowances which enable to maintain 
home care arrangements with the help of informal caregivers. 
The ageing of society will increase the number of persons in care dependency and will reduce 
the number of potential informal caregivers. Both developments challenge the sustainability 
of German SLTCI. A number of reform options have been suggested by several authors and 
are reviewed here. Some of these reform options suggest to only slightly adjusting the status 
quo system to take account of the changed demands, whereas other proposals postulate a 
radical reform of abolishing the pay-as-you-go system in favor of a system with funding 
principle. Despite the availability of options and the concerns about the status quo, the 
German legislator introduced a first reform of the SLTCI system in 2008. Although 
remarkable innovations were adopted like the nominal adjustment of benefits to maintain 
constant real values, the reform has to be criticized as being non-sustainable already in the 
medium-run. Therefore, further reforms will be necessary in the near future. 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Das vorliegende Papier gibt einen Überblick über die Soziale Pflegeversicherung (SPV) in 
Deutschland. Neben einer Beschreibung des Aufbaus und der Finanzierung der SPV werden 
die Reformvorschläge der letzten Jahre und die Reform im Pflegeweiterentwicklungsgesetz 
betrachtet. Die SPV unterstützt pflegebedürftige Personen, in dem ein Teil der Kosten zur 
Deckung des Pflegebedarfs direkt oder indirekt übernommen wird. Wie die übrigen 
Sozialversicherungen ist auch die SPV im Umlageverfahren organisiert. Anspruchsberechtigte 
Pflegebedürftige können entsprechend der vorliegenden Schwere des Pflegebedarfs 
unterschiedliche Leistungstypen (z.B. Pflegegeld oder Pflegesachleistungen) in verschiedenen 
Leistungshöhen (sog. Pflegestufen) erhalten. Die Anspruchsberechtigung ist dabei 
unabhängig vom individuellen Einkommen oder Vermögen der Person. Der Großteil der 
Leistungsbezieher wird gegenwärtig häuslich versorgt und erhält ein Pflegegeld. 
Durch den demographischen Wandel und eine alternde Gesellschaft wird die Zahl der 
pflegebedürftigen Personen weiter ansteigen, gleichzeitig reduziert sich die Zahl der 
Personen, die insbesondere die häusliche Pflege übernehmen können. Beide Entwicklungen 
gefährden den Status Quo der SPV im Hinblick auf eine nachhaltige Teilabsicherung der 
Pflegebedarfe. Zur Fortführung und Stabilisierung der Absicherung von Pflegerisiken wurden 
eine Reihe unterschiedlicher Reformvorschläge von verschiedenen Autoren vorgelegt. Die 
Bandbreite der diskutierten Optionen reicht dabei von einer graduellen Anpassung des 
gegenwärtigen Systems durch Ausweitung der Gruppe der Beitragszahler über hybride 
Modelle aus Umlageverfahren und Kapitaldeckung bis zu einer vollständigen Abschaffung 
des Umlageverfahrens und Ersatz durch eine kapitalgedeckte Versicherung. Der Gesetzgeber 
hat mit dem Pflegeweiterentwicklungsgesetz einen ersten Reformschritt vollzogen. Obwohl 
die Reform einige lange kritisierte Einschränkungen der SPV verändert hat, z.B. wurde eine 
schrittweise Anpassung der Leistungshöhen zum Ausgleich der allgemeinen Teuerung 
beschlossen, bleibt insbesondere die mittel- und langfristige Finanzierbarkeit im gegebenen 
institutionellen Rahmen unklar. Eine zeitnahe Fortführung der Reformierung der SPV 
erscheint notwendig. 
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Abstract
This paper describes the Social Long-Term Care Insurance (SLTCI) in Germany. Based
on a short review of the history of long-term care organization and the preceding laws
in Germany, the implementation of the SLTCI as a self-standing pillar within the system
of social insurances in Germany and its set-up with regard to eligibility criteria, service
provision and financial budget are presented. Since SLTCI is a universal, contribution-
financed insurance the ageing society and the corresponding shifts in the number of persons
in need of care and the number of persons potentially providing informal care are challenges
for its sustainability. Therefore, recently suggested reform options are discussed at the end
of the paper showing potential pathways to a sufficient provision of care services in the
future.
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1 Introduction
This paper describes the organization of long-term care in Germany as part of the welfare
state. Therefore, we will focus on the Social Long-Term Care Insurance (SLTCI) introduced
in 1995 which is one of the main pillars of the German system of social insurances besides,
e.g., unemployment insurance, health insurance, and the pension system. As most (western)
societies, Germany faces a demographic transition that will more than double the number of
elderly individuals in need of long-term care and at the same time will decrease the number
of informal caregivers. As a consequence, public responsibility for the provision of long-term
care will continue to grow. In light of the current and expected changes the sustainability of
the SLTCI has to be questioned. In particular, maintaining the real values of benefits with an
increasing number of benefit claimants, on the one hand, and a decrease in revenues due to
shifts in the population of contributors, on the other hand, emphasize the reform pressures on
the current system.
To organize the presentation of the paper, we will order the discussion chronologically. We
will start in section 2 with a characterization of SLTCI including the discussion and organiza-
tion preceding its introduction. Before 1995 when SLTCI was implemented, long-term care was
considered within welfare assistance. However, this approach had two severe shortcomings. On
the one hand, receiving welfare assistance is not without stigma for the eligible persons. On
the other hand, welfare assistance is administered by municipalities. Thus, raising numbers of
benefit recipients lead to financial strains. The introduction of SLTCI augmented the system
of social insurances. Similar to the other types of insurances, financing is organized by con-
tributions from gross income subject to social insurance contributions. SLTCI therefore covers
almost everybody in Germany, except groups that are allowed to privately insure against long-
term care risk. In the current state, Germany therefore provides a universal, non means-tested
contribution-financed social insurance for long-term care that is intended to provide a partially
comprehensive cover of the benefit claimant. Similar to the other social insurances in Germany,
it is organized as a pay-as-you-go system.
The benefit scheme allows for some flexibility in the provision of services due to recognition
of different levels of care dependency and different types of benefits available including cash
allowances, on the one hand, and support for institutional care, on the other hand. In the
current situation, most claimants apply for cash allowances that should enable to maintain
home care arrangements with the help of informal carers. Details with regard to the benefit
scheme, the administration of services, the financial situation and the shares of persons opting
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for the different types of benefits available will be presented in section 3.
The sustainability of the system has to be questioned given projections of the number of
future benefit claimants and the number of future contribution payers. Several authors have
analyzed the threats of the German SLTCI system, and we will review the major aspects and
the corresponding reform proposals in detail in section 4. Recognition of the options proposed
for Germany could also be helpful for other countries facing a similar situation. Despite the
array of reform options, the German legislator has recently adopted a first reform in 2008. The
main changes as well as an evaluation will be provided at the end of section 4.
2 The German Social Long-Term Care Insurance (SLTCI)
2.1 Background: The Situation Until Introduction of SLTCI in 1995
The foundation of the German welfare system is laid out in the German Constitution (Grundge-
setz ) that guarantees living in dignity.1 The welfare system today comprises unemployment in-
surance, welfare, health insurance, retirement pensions, and long-term care insurance. Despite
its comprehensive nature, the single facets of the system were introduced at different points in
time during the last decades. Long-term care insurance is the most recent augmentation intro-
duced in 1995 as a self-standing pillar of the welfare system; however, consideration of support
for care requirements was not new within German welfare.
Support for long-term care was first regarded in the federal law of welfare assistance (Bun-
dessozialhilfegesetz ) adopted in 1962. Besides the rules for social welfare it contained a section
defining so-called special public long-term care assistance (Hilfe zur Pflege) and long-term care
was organized as a part of welfare assistance. This special public long-term care assistance
provided a means-tested allowance in order to support people in need of help. At that time, the
notion of being in need of care was not explicitly defined further but every “helpless” person
has been eligible for allowances. Allowances were administered on the state level and differed
between states due to the federalist system in Germany. The majority of processing and funding
was allocated to local providers of welfare, e.g. counties or independent cities.
By the mid 1970s, an important debate on the prospects of people in need of care was initiated
by a report of Kuratorium Deutsche Altershilfe (1974). The report illustrated how people in need
of long-term care were “deported” to institutional care seen as cases of irreversible illness along
the lines of care instead of cure. It demonstrated (and postulated) that health insurers should
be obliged to account for expenses of institutional care by arguing that care cannot be separated
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from the definition of illness in terms of the insurance-legal definitions. At that time, people
had to pay expenses for institutional care themselves and, therefore, a rising number of older
persons became welfare dependent. This development also stressed the financial situation of the
local authorities who were in charge of providing the special public long-term care insurance.
The number of people eligible for benefits more than doubled from 165,000 in 1963 to 335,000
in 1973 and peaked in 1992 with 675,000 (now including the reunified Germany).
Both, on the one hand, the growing number of elderly becoming welfare dependent even if
they had worked their whole lives (which induced a kind of stigma effect) and, on the other hand,
the imbalance between welfare grants and costs for stationary care and the associated financial
pressures for municipalities were the starting points of the discussion of adopting a self-standing
long-term care insurance. Nevertheless, both arguments were important but not the only ones
put forward. As emphasized by Go¨tting, Haug, and Hinrichs (1994), in addition, the strain
of doing informal care with a shrinking supply of informal carers and concerns about supply
and quality of professional care for increasing demands were mentioned. An early proposition
for a self-standing insurance in Germany was made by the Association of Public and Private
Welfare in 1981 (Deutscher Verein fu¨r o¨ffentliche und private Fu¨rsorge, 1981). They suggested
to integrate long-term care into the social insurance system using the argumentation that being
in need of care is a general risk of life. Furthermore, they criticized that the principle of
subordination – applicable for welfare – was constantly violated since special public long-term
care assistance claimed the largest part of welfare payments and therefore was not paid for
exceptional circumstances of life. This early proposition was resembled in the later implemented
social long-term care insurance, but it took another fourteen years to pass the law.
According to Campbell (2002) there are two main alternatives to implement long-term care
provision: 1) Direct service provision financed by taxes or 2) social insurance financed by con-
tributions. The choice between those extreme alternatives is mainly influenced by the already
existing structure of the insurances and tax system.2 Both alternatives were part of the discus-
sion in Germany as well, but in addition two insurance solutions were discussed: A private and a
social insurance.3 While Liberals, the employer-oriented Christian Democrats and the employ-
ers’ association clearly favored a private insurance, the employee-oriented Christian Democrats
proposed a social insurance. In contrast to that, trade unions, the Social Democrats and the
Greens together with smaller interest groups (physicians association, representatives of handi-
capped, self-administered bodies of sickness funds and small white-collar unions) first favored a
tax-transfer scheme, but at least the Social Democrats and the trade unions later switched to
support the idea of a social insurance.
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Figure 1: Special Public Long-term Care Assistance: Recipients and Expenses (1991 to 2007)
year 1991 1992 1993
recipients (in 1000) 655 675 660
expenses (in Mio. EUR) 6.492 7.508 8.427
total expenses for social assistance 19.090 21.782 25.012
share of total expenses for social assistance 34.01% 34.47% 33.69%
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Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (2009a), p. 37, own representation
After a long debate (that was delayed due to German Unification in 1990) finally a universal,
non means-tested, contribution financed long-term care insurance being part of the German
social insurance system was adopted. On May 26th, 1994 parliament passed the associated law.
However, in contrast to health insurance, SLTCI was not intended to fully cover the risk of being
in need of long-term care. The new insurance was a partially comprehensive insurance with the
aim to cover only the basic needs. Therefore, special public long-term care assistance as part
of social welfare was not abolished but its relevance decreased significantly (see Figure 1). As
from June 1st, 1994 long-term care insurance funds were installed at every health insurer and
from January 1st, 1995 contribution payments started. Benefit payment did not start before
April 1st, 1995 for out-patient care and from July 1st, 1996 for in-patient care. Therefore, an
initial stock of savings could be set up (more details of the financial structure of SLTCI will be
presented below in section 2.3).
2.2 Institutional Framework
As indicated above, SLTCI is part of the social insurance system which consists of five pillars:
unemployment insurance, health insurance, pension insurance, accident insurance and long-term
care insurance. They all follow the principles of solidarity, self-administration and funding by
social insurance contributions. Social insurance is generally compulsory for all employees, for
health insurance and SLTCI respectively up to a certain income threshold, the so-called social
insurance ceiling. There is no such threshold for the other social insurances. Contributions
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are calculated as the given percentage rates up to the so-called social insurance contribution
assessment ceiling. This is the maximum gross income up to which income is subject to social
insurance contributions. If income exceeds this level only the social insurance contribution as-
sessment ceiling is considered for deductions. In 2003, it was set to e 45,900 and is increased
by the ratio of per capita gross salary in the preceding year and the pre-preceding year.In 2008
it amounted to a yearly gross income of e 48,600. Some groups are exempted from compulsory
coverage: Civil servants, soldiers and people older than 65 years are exempted from unem-
ployment insurance. Self-employed are exempted from health and SLTC insurance, and civil
servants from pension insurance in addition.
Table 1: Development of Contribution Rates for Social Insurances (in %)
1995 2000 2005 2009
Unemployment Insurance 6.50 6.50 6.50 2.80
Health Insurance* 13.20 (12.80) 13.60 (13.80) 14.20 (14.00) 14.00
Long-term Care Insurance 1.00 1.70 1.70** 1.95**
Pension Insurance 18.60 19.30 19.50 19.90
Employees subject to social insurance
contribution (in 1000)
28,118 27,826 26,178 22,560
* values in brackets apply to East Germany
** employees’ contribution is 0.25%points higher for childless people
Source: Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (2009)
Except for accident insurance where financing is exclusively provided by employers, all other
social insurances are financed by contributions on the basis of parity.4 Table 1 shows the develop-
ment of contribution rates for the four insurances where financing is shared and the development
of the number of all employees subject to social insurance contributions.
Unlike the other four pillars the SLTCI does not have an independent administrative organi-
zation. It is co-administered by the existing health insurance funds. In June 1994, SLTCI funds
have been installed at every existing public health insurer. To compensate health insurers for
taking over administrative tasks there is a fiscal equalization scheme obliging the SLTCI funds.
According to Arntz, Sacchetto, Spermann, and und Sarah Widmaier (2006) there are about 250
SLTCI funds in Germany.5
The general funding of SLTCI is organized as a pay-as-you-go scheme. Private LTCI funds
instead rely on prospective entitlements. This means that provisions are kept from each person
insured and for employees private LTCI funds also receive a grant from employers to the same
amount as for social LTCI.6 The federal states are responsible for providing an adequate infras-
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tructure for long-term care. The SLTCI funds have to ensure that the benefit claimant receives
the requested and entitled benefits. Therefore the SLTC insurers contract with ambulatory and
institutional suppliers to guarantee provision of long-term care.
2.3 Funding
When payment of contributions started in 1995, the rate corresponded to 1% of gross income. In
July 1996, the premium was increased to 1.7%. To account for the fact that childless people will
on average receive higher benefits from the SLTCI funds compared to people cared by their own
children, in 2005 an additional premium to be paid by childless people of 0.25%points of gross
income subject to social insurance contributions was introduced.7 In consequence, childless em-
ployees also contribute more than their employers and financing is no longer based on parity.
Exempted are childless persons born before 1940, persons younger than 23, and recipients of un-
employment assistance or persons in military or alternative service. Another increase of premia
is in effect since July 2008. In the course of a novel of the SLTCI law (Pflegeweiterentwick-
lungsgesetz ) to finance adjusted benefits, contributions were further increased by 0.25%points
so that premia for people with children are now 1.95% and for childless people 2.2% of gross
income subject to social insurance contributions (see below for a more detailed discussion of
this recent reform).
At the time of introduction of SLTCI, employers where not in favor of adding another so-
cial insurance due to higher labor costs. However, employees agreed to resign a public holiday
(the day of repentance) in order to prevent the non-wage labor costs to rise. The economic
activity of an extra working day (the abandoned public holiday) was thought to finance the
employers’ contributions.8 Thus, SLTCI has in fact never been a social insurance on the ba-
sis of parity. Although contributions were shared mathematically equally, employees indeed
compensate the share of employers by working an additional day per year. Residents in the
federal state of Saxony voted against this split and kept the public holiday in return for higher
contributions of employees: In 1995, employees with children paid 1.475% and employers only
0.475%, 0.5%points less than on a basis of parity.9 The later adjustments of contribution rates
took account of this initial difference.
As contribution payments started before benefit payments a stock of savings has been built.
However, in 1998 the positive difference in revenues and spending vanished and expenses ex-
ceeded revenues from 1999 to 2005 and again in 2007 (see Figure 2).10 Higher contribution rates
due to the recent reform in 2008 (see below) will temporally mitigate this development. SLTC
6
Figure 2: Revenues and Expenses of SLTCI from 1995-2008 in billion e
Die Finanzentwicklung der sozialen Pflegeversicherung
            Ist-Ergebnisse ohne Rechnungsabgrenzung 1)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Bezeichnung
in Mrd. €  *)
Einnahmen
Beitragseinnahmen 8.31 11.90 15.77 15.80 16.13 16.31 16.56 16.76 16.61 16.64 19.6117.38 17.8618.36
davon
     Beiträge an Pflegekassen 6.85 9.84 13.06 13.04 13.32 13.46 13.66 13.57 13.30 13.28 15.9113.98 14.4414.94
     Beiträge an den Ausgleichsfonds 1.46 2.06 2.71 2.76 2.80 2.86 2.90 3.19 3.31 3.36 3.40 3.42 3.42 3.71
Sonstige Einnahmen 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16
Einnahmen insgesamt 8.41 12.04 15.94 16.00 16.32 16.54 16.81 16.98 16.86 16.87 17.49 18.49 18.02 19.77
Ausgaben
Leistungsausgaben 4.42 10.25 14.34 15.07 15.55 15.86 16.03 16.47 16.64 16.77 18.2016.98 17.14 17.45
davon
     Geldleistung 3.04 4.44 4.32 4.28 4.24 4.18 4.11 4.18 4.11 4.08 4.244.024.05 4.03
     Pflegesachleistung 0.69 1.54 1.77 1.99 2.13 2.23 2.29 2.37 2.38 2.37 2.40 2.42 2.47 2.60
     Pflegeurlaub 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.29
     Tages-/Nachtpflege 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11
     Zusätzliche Betreuungsleistungen 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06
     Kurzzeitpflege 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.27
     Soziale Sicherung der Pflegepersonen 0.31 0.93 1.19 1.16 1.13 1.07 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.87
     Pflegemittel/ techn. Hilfen etc. 0.20 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.46
     Vollstationäre Pflege 0.00 2.69 6.41 6.84 7.18 7.48 7.75 8.00 8.20 8.35 8.52 8.67 8.83 9.05
     Vollstationäre Pflege in Behindertenheimen 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
Hälfte der Kosten des Medizinischen Dienstes 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28
Verwaltungsausgaben 2) 0.32 0.36 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.65
Sonstige Ausgaben 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ausgaben insgesamt 4.97 10.86 15.14 15.88 16.35 16.67 16.87 17.36 17.56 17.69 17.86 18.03 18.34 19.14
Liquidität
Überschuß der Einnahmen 3.44 1.18 0.80 0.13  ---  --- --- --- --- --- 0.63--- ---0.45
Überschuß der Ausgaben  ---  ---  --- --- 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.38 0.69 0.82 0.36 --- 0.32 ---
Investitionsdarlehen an den Bund -0.56  ---  ---  --- --- --- --- +0,56 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Mittelbestand am Jahresende 2.87 4.05 4.86 4.99 4.95 4.82 4.76 4.93 4.24 3.42 3.05 3.50 3.18 3.81
in Monatsausgaben lt. Haushaltsplänen
der Kassen 3.93 2.96 3.77 3.70 3.61 3.37 3.27 3.34 2.82 2.27 2.01 2.29 2.06 2.33
* Werte der amtlichen Statistik wurden von DM in € umgerechnet.
1) Abweichungen in den Summen durch Rundungen
2) 1995 einschließlich Vorlaufkostenerstattung an die Krankenkassen
Quelle: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 
 
Jahr 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
revenues 8.41 12.04 15.94 16.00 16.32 16.54 16.81 16.98 16.86 16.87 17.49 18.49 18.02 19.77
expenses 4.97 10.86 15.14 15.88 16.35 16.67 16.87 17.36 17.56 17.69 17.86 18.03 18.34 19.14
stock of savings 2.87 4.05 4.86 4.99 4.95 4.82 4.76 4.93 4.24 3.42 3.05 3.50 3.18 3.81
Ergebnis 3.44 1.18 0.80 0.12 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.38 -0.70 -0.82 -0.37 0.46 -0.32 0.63
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Data source: Federal Ministery of Health (2009b)
insurers are obliged to withhold a stock of savings that consists of at least 50% of the monthly
benefit spending designated in the budget. Therefore, on average the stock of savings at the
end of each year corresponded to about two to three months of benefit spending.
An important f cet of the ong-term care insurance system in Germany is that insurance is
compulsory. Members of social health insurance are automatically insured for SLTCI. Every
person earning less than the social insurance ceiling is a member of this system. It covers all
additional-insured persons like spouses and children; altogether there are around 70 million
people insured. Persons voluntarily insured at social health insurance are also automatically
insured at SLTCI. Furthermore, there are another 9.25 million persons insured at private LTCI
funds (associated with the private health insurance funds). Thus, despite compulsory coverage
there are approximately 3 million persons not insured for the risk of being in need of care.
3 Eligibility, Care Levels and Provision of Services
3.1 Eligibility and Assessment
Persons are eligible for SLTCI payments when they are frail.11 This applies to “a person who
requires for a minimum period of approximately six months, permanent, frequent or extensive
help in performing a special number of ‘activities of daily life’(ADL) and ‘instrumental activities
of daily life’ (IADL) due to physical, mental or psychological illness or disability”, see Arntz,
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Sacchetto, Spermann, and und Sarah Widmaier (2006). ADL consist of abilities necessary
for fundamental functioning like bathing, dressing and undressing, eating, using the toilet, or
walking. Next to it, IADL comprise besides others “telephoning, shopping, food preparation,
housekeeping, laundering, use of transportation, use of medicine, and financial behavior”, see
Lawton and Brody (1969). These tasks provide the basis of an independent life and are affected
in an earlier stage of disease or disability.
Table 2: Assessment Guidelines of Medical Review Board
Domain Examined activities
Personal Care washing, showering, bathing, dental care, combing, shaving, micturition and
defecation
Nutrition preparation of bite-sized meals and assistance with ingestion
Mobility getting up and going to bed, changing the position independently, dressing
and undressing, walking, standing, climbing stairs, leaving and entering the
accommodation, (e.g. for consulting a physician)
Housekeeping shopping, cooking, cleaning, washing up, changing and laundering clothes,
heating the apartment
On behalf of SLTC insurers the Medical Review Board of health insurers (Medizinischer
Dienst der Krankenkassen) is responsible for assessing the individual level of required care.
The four basic domains of activities evaluated by the Medical review Board are personal care,
nutrition, mobility and housekeeping. The assessments guidelines enumerate a number of special
activities examined in every domain (see Table 2).
Apparently, the notion of being in need of care is clarified with the help of assessing ADL
as well as IADL. The actual assessment of the individual is undertaken by physicians and
nurses mandated by the Medical Review Board. According to the Federal Ministry of Health
(Bundesministerium fu¨r Gesundheit) the probability of being in need of care is 0.7% for persons
younger than 60, 4.4% for persons between 60 and 80 years, and increases to 28.6% for persons
older than 80 years.
After having evaluated a person’s level of care required, the corresponding demand of time for
provision of services is assessed. Three different care levels are assigned according to the tasks
and time needed. Care levels are differentiated with regard to severity of care dependency.
Table 3 shows the respective attribution of care level, need for help, and time necessary for
provision.
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Table 3: Care Levels and Care Needed
Care level I Care level II Care level III
(need for considerable
care)
(need for intensive
care)
(need for highly
intensive care)
assistance for
personal care,
nutrition or
mobility
at least once a day for at
least two tasks in one or
more areas
at least three times a
day at different times
of the day
assistance around the
clock
assistance for
housekeeping
several times per week several times per
week
several times per week
time needed* at least 90 min./day on
average thereof no more
than 45 min./day for
housekeeping
at least 3h/day on
average thereof no
more than 1h for
housekeeping
at least 5h/day on
average thereof no
more than 1h/day for
housekeeping
* time exposure is calculated for non-professional carers.
3.2 Provision of Services
Services could be provided in three different ways. Home care (family members or non-
professional private persons), home help service (professional staff for ambulatory help) and
institutional care. The latter can be provided in different kinds of institutions like old age
homes, residential care homes and nursing homes (Lundsgaard, 2005) where the care depen-
dency of residents is highest in nursing homes. Since the introduction of SLTCI in 1995 the
number of benefit claimants increased steadily. Figure 3 shows the development of benefit re-
cipients in total and for recipients of home (home care and home help service) and institutional
benefits respectively. When assuming constant probabilities of becoming dependent on care, ex-
pected demographic development will lead to an increase of 50% in need of care, or, in absolute
values, one million additional claimants for benefits (Federal Ministery of Health, 2009a).
SLTCI favors home care (including home help service) compared to the more expensive in-
stitutional care. This order of preference is also reflected in the variety of benefits trying to
facilitate flexible care arrangements. The following numeration shortly characterizes all avail-
able kinds of benefits. The first five kinds of benefits apply to home care and home help service
respectively.
Benefits in Kind
Benefits in kind consist of help for personal care, nutrition, mobility, and housekeeping and is
carried out by professional care providers. Providers have to be licensed by the SLTCI funds
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Figure 3: Benefit Recipients 1995-2008
2 500 000
Pflegeversicherung
Leistungsempfänger der sozialen Pflegeversicherung am Jahresende nach Pflegestufen 
a) absolut
Jahr
2 000 ambulant 000 stationär 1) insgesamt
Pflegestufe I Pflegestufe II Pflegestufe III zusammen Pflegestufe I Pflegestufe II Pflegestufe III zusammen Pflegestufe I Pflegestufe II Pflegestufe III zusammen
1995 - - - 1 061 418 - - -   0 - - - 1 061 418
19961 500 50 000 8.462 507.329 146.393 1.162.184 111.856 162.818 109.888 384.562 620.318 670.147 256.281 1.546.746
1997 568.481 486.263 142.933 1.197.677 159.383 189.702 113.186 462.271 727.864 675.965 256.119 1.659.948
1998 616.506 471.906 138.303 1.226.715 187.850 210amb.525ulant 113.028 511.403 804.356 682.431 251.331 1.738.118
1999 668.314 472.189 139.876 1.280.379 203.950 226.657 115.376 545.983 872.264 698.846 255.252 1.826.362
20001 000 68 000 1.700 448.427 130.698 1.260.825 210.883 234stat.839ionary 115.622 561.344 892.583 683.266 246.320 1.822.169
2001 697.714 436.693 127.260 1.261.667 218.909 242tota.779l 116.247 577.935 916.623 679.472 243.507 1.839.602
2002 725.993 435.924 127.235 1.289.152 230.383 249.600 119.834 599.817 956.376 685.524 247.069 1.888.969
2003 73500 000 3.302 424.682 123.414 1.281.398 237.907 254.477 121.635 614.019 971.209 679.159 245.049 1.895.417
2004 746.140 426.632 123.039 1.296.811 245.327 258.926 124.639 628.892 991.467 685.558 248.678 1.925.703
2005 759.114 425.843 124.549 1.309.506 251.730 262.528 128.189 642.447 1.010.844 688.371 252.738 1.951.953
2006 760 7.978 418.617 123.156 1.309.751 265.294 264.492 128.968 658.754 1.033.272 683.109 252.124 1.968.505
2007 2) 804.628 426.855 126.718 1.358.201 273.090 266.222 131.772 671.084 1.077.718 693.077 258.490 2.029.285
2008 2) 861.575 439.605 131.354 1.432.534 274.925 273.016 133.010 680.951 1.136.500 712.621 264.364 2.113.485
b) in v.H.
Jahr ambulant stationär 1) insgesamtPflegestufe I Pflegestufe II Pflegestufe III zusammen Pflegestufe I Pflegestufe II Pflegestufe III zusammen Pflegestufe I Pflegestufe II Pflegestufe III zusammen
1995 - - - 100,0 - - - - - - - 100,0
1996 43,8 43,7 12,6 100,0 29,1 42,3 28,6 100,0 40,1 43,3 16,6 100,0
1997 47,5 40,6 11,9 100,0 34,5 41,0 24,5 100,0 43,9 40,7 15,4 100,0
1998 50,3 38,5 11,3 100,0 36,7 41,2 22,1 100,0 46,3 39,3 14,5 100,0
1999 52,2 36,9 10,9 100,0 37,4 41,5 21,1 100,0 47,8 38,3 14,0 100,0
2000 54,1 35,6 10,4 100,0 37,6 41,8 20,6 100,0 49,0 37,5 13,5 100,0
2001 55,3 34,6 10,1 100,0 37,9 42,0 20,1 100,0 49,8 36,9 13,2 100,0
2002 56,3 33,8 9,9 100,0 38,4 41,6 20,0 100,0 50,6 36,3 13,1 100,0
2003 57,2 33,1 9,6 100,0 38,7 41,4 19,8 100,0 51,2 35,8 12,9 100,0
2004 57,5 32,9 9,6 100,0 39,0 41,2 19,8 100,0 51,5 35,6 12,9 100,0
2005 58,0 32,5 9,5 100,0 39,2 40,9 20,0 100,0 51,8 35,3 12,9 100,0
2006 58,6 32,0 9,4 100,0 40,3 40,2 19,6 100,0 52,5 34,7 12,8 100,0
2007 59,2 31,4 9,3 100,0 40,7 39,7 19,6 100,0 53,1 34,2 12,7 100,0
2008 60,1 30,7 9,2 100,0 40,4 40,1 19,5 100,0 53,8 33,7 12,5 100,0
1) stationäre Leistungen erst ab 1.7.1996 eingeführt
2) Anstieg 2007 und 2008 im ambulanten Bereich infolge verbesserter Erfassung überzeichnet
Quelle: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit  
2) Increase 2007 and 2008 due to improved regis ration methods.Source: Federal Ministery of Heal h (2009a)
and sign provision contracts. The amount of care provided depends on the actual needs of a
person but is limited in value according to the assigned care level and to services included in a
pre-defined catalogue. Table 4 shows the respective monetary amounts which can be spent for
benefits in kind for each care level.
Additional benefits can be allocated for persons at care level III in cases of hardship, but only
up to a maximum value of e 1,912 per month if extraordinary effort is necessary (e.g. at the
end-stage of cancer). Moreover, these extra benefits can only be granted to 3% of all insured
persons at care level III.
Table 4: Benefits in Kind According to Care Level (Monthly Values in e)
Care Level Before 07/2008
From
07/2008
2010 2012
Care Level I 384 420 440 450
Care Level II 921 980 1,040 1,100
Care Level III 1,432 1,470 1,510 1,550
Cash Allowances
Alternatively, persons can opt for lump-sum payments, so-called cash allowances. With this
kind of benefits, care can also be provided by other persons than the contract partners of
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SLTCI funds, namely personal care assistants or informal carers (family members or other
non-professionals). The person in need of care can decide whether to purchase services from a
provider of choice, to use the cash allowance to remunerate informal care givers, or to spend it
on something completely different. Thus, lump-sum transfers are not bound to the purchase of
care but in turn are smaller than benefits in kind as Table 5 shows.
Table 5: Cash Allowances According to Care Levels (Monthly Values in e)
Care Level Before 07/2008
From
07/2008
2010 2012
Care Level I 205 215 225 235
Care Level II 410 420 430 440
Care Level III 665 675 685 700
It should be noted that cash allowances can only be granted when services for the caring needs
are provided by a third person, i.e. not the person herself. Compliance with this eligibility rule
is checked by regular visits from agents of an information center licensed by SLTCI funds and
takes place at least once in six months for persons with care levels I or II and at least once in
three months for persons with care level III.
Combination
If benefits in kind are not exhausted, the rest of the entitlement could be paid proportionally
as a cash allowance. These combinations of benefits in kind and cash allowances do not alter
the overall level of benefits. The allocation is binding for the next six months and can only be
changed afterwards.
Auxiliary Care Products
Benefit recipients are entitled to auxiliary care products that facilitate care but only for basic
equipment. Technical products like wheelchairs are provided without additional costs. Con-
sumer goods as disinfectants are provided up to monthly costs of e 31. Measures that enable a
person to live more independently in his or her own accommodation can be supported up to a
value of e 2,557 but with co-payment of the insured depending on income.
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Respite Care
When care is provided informally there may be need for a substitute of the carer, e.g. in cases of
illness or leave. Therefore, the person in need of care could be entitled to so-called respite care
for a maximum duration of four weeks per year. Requirements for receiving respite care are that
the person taking over the care services is not a direct family member of the person depending
on care and that informal care has been provided for at least six months before respite care
is requested. If respite care is provided by professional carers additional benefits amount to a
maximum value of e 1,470 per year in 2008 (e 1,510 in 2010 and e 1,550 in 2012). If the respite
caregiver is a family member or lives in the same household as the care dependent person only
the lump-sum transfers are paid but additional expenses (for example for traveling or loss of
earnings) can be remunerated up to maximum values applying for professional respite care.
Day and Night Care
Day and night care provides another example for the priority given to home care arrangements
compared to institutional care in SLTCI. When home care or home help service is not sufficient
(for example due to special needs during the night), a part-time institutional arrangement can
be offered. Day/night care comprises transportation to and from the institution. It can be
combined with benefits in kind and/or cash allowance, but the total value must not exceed
150% of the underlying type of benefits, i.e. if day/night care is requested only up to 50% of
the values in Table 6, the person in need of care is still entitled to 100% of benefits in kind or
cash allowance respectively.
Table 6: Day/Night Care Benefits According to Care Levels (Monthly Values in e)
Care Level Before 07/2008
From
07/2008
2010 2012
Care Level I 384 420 440 450
Care Level II 921 980 1,040 1,100
Care Level III 1,432 1,470 1,510 1,550
Short-Term Care
Short-term care implies institutional care for a maximum duration of four weeks per year. It
is granted if day/night care or home care is not sufficient, for example after a stay in hospital
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when the person is still too frail for home care or day/night care. Benefits amount to the same
values as for respite care (see Table 6).
Institutional Care
A person is entitled to institutional care if home care and similar forms of benefits are not
adequate. Benefits are displayed in Table 7 and must not exceed 75% of total expenditures of
the institution. The highest amount of benefits in case of hardship cannot be granted to more
than 5% of insured persons at care level III. If someone chooses this kind of care regardless of
necessity, the person is only entitled to the maximum value of benefits in kind and has to pay
for additional costs. If persons in institutions for disabled people are in need of care, SLTCI
funds account for up to 10% of monthly charges but not more than e 256 per month.
Table 7: Benefits for Institutional Care According to Care Levels (Monthly Values in e)
Care Level Before 07/2008
From
07/2008
2010 2012
Care Level I 1,023 1,023 1,023 1,023
Care Level II 1,279 1,279 1,279 1,279
Care Level III 1,432 1,470 1,510 1,550
Cases of Hardship 1,432 1,750 1,825 1,918
Further Benefits
In addition to cash allowances which can be given to carers there is some additional assistance.
SLTCI funds pay contributions to pension funds if informal carers do not work more than 30
hours per week and spend at least 14 hours per week for care.12 Coverage for accident insurance
is comprised automatically. If informal carers are on a leave scheme for providing care for a
person they receive grants for contributions to unemployment insurance, social health insurance
and SLTCI.13 Furthermore, SLTCI funds pay courses that teach family members and informal
carers how to provide home care.
Until the reform in 2008 the notion of being in need of care did not include persons impaired
by dementia, mental handicap or psychic diseases as the definition was constrained to physical
restrictions. Since July 2008 persons with psychic impairment (eingeschra¨nkte Alltagskompe-
tenz ) are also entitled to benefits.14 The benefits are not assigned for basic care or housekeeping
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but for supervision and amount to e 100 per month for basic cases and e 200 for more severe
cases. The money can be used to purchase any kind of benefit desired.
Figure 4: Expenses for Different Kinds of Benefits 1995-2006 in e
combination of  benefits
0 2 0
Pflegevers riche ung  
Leistungsempfänger der sozialen Pflegeversicherung im Jahresdurchschnitt nach Leistungsarten 2 500 000
(errechnet aus Leistungstagen) 1) 2)
a) absolut
Leistungsart
Jahr Pflegegeld Pflegesachleistung Kombinationsleistung Urlaubspflege Tages- und Nachtpflege Kurzzeitpflege Vollstationäre Pflege Vollstationäre Pflege in Behindertenheimen insgesamt
19952 000   88000 7 697  82 763  82 330  10 464  1 777  3 652 - - 1 068 682
1996 3)  943 877  105 879  135 305  6 804  3 639  5 731  355 142  5 711 1 562 087
1997  970 775  119 167  157 390  3 712  5 058  5 627  424 853  38 417 1 725 000
1998  962 669  133 895  171 764  4 070  6 774  6 199  452 750  56 543 1 794 664
1999  982 877  152 648  192 556  5 716  8 673  7 146  485 014  53 875 1 888 505
2000  954 684  159 693  193 018  6 313  10 287  7 696stationary care in homes for disabled peopl  494 793  55 641 1 882 125e
20011 5 0   96000 2 130  161 653  201 667  7 495  12 177  8 108  513 377  58 446 1 925 053
2002  977 327  165 679  205 322  8 841  13 148  8 615stationary care  532 278  60 428 1 971 638
2003  968 289  169 580  202 710  10 362  13 864short‐  9 317term care  540 070  63 104 1 977 296
2004  959 580  169 357  203 544  12 145  15 045  9 989  548 647  65 052 1 983 358
2005  959 546  173 251  204 348  14 263  16 024day   11 140and night care  559 784  66 389 2 004 744
2006  977 034  180 944  208 825  18 714  16 767respite  13 096 care  575 846  68 987 2 060 214
20071  0   98000 6 294  184 280  217 724  22 834  17 027  13 613  588 827  71 517 2 102 116
b) in v. H. benefits in kind
Leistungsart
Jahr Pflegegeld Pflegesach- Kombinations- Urlaubs- Tages- und
cash a
Kurzzeit- Vollstati
llowances
onäre Vollstationäre insgesamt
leistung leistung pflege Nachtpflege pflege Pflege Pflege in Be-
hindertenheimen500 000
1995 83, 7 7, 7 7, 1 0, 0, 0 3, 100- - ,
1996 3) 60,4 6,8 8,7 0,4 0,2 0,4 22,7 0,4 100,0
1997 56,3 6,9 9,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 24,6 2,2 100,0
1998 53,6 7,5 9,6 0,2 0,4 0,3 25,2 3,2 100,0
1999 52,0 8,1 10,2 0,3 0,5 0,4 25,7 2,9 100,0
2000 50,7 8,5 10,3 0,3 0,5 0,4 26,3 3,0 100,0
2001 50,0 8,4 10,5 0,4 0,6 0,4 26,7 3,0 100,0
2002 49,6 8,4 10,4 0,4 0,7 0,4 27,0 3,1 100,0
2003 49,0 8,6 10,3 0,5 0,7 0,5 27,3 3,2 100,0
2004 48,4 8,5 10,3 0,6 0,8 0,5 27,7 3,3 100,0
2005 47,9 8,5 10,2 0,7 0,8 0,6 27,9 3,3 100,0
2006 47,4 8,8 10,1 0,9 0,8 0,6 28,0 3,3 100,0
2007 46,9 8,8 10,4 1,1 0,8 0,6 28,0 3,4 100,0
1) Abweichungen in den Summen durch Rundungen
2) Einschließlich Mehrfachzählungen durch den gleichzeitigen Bezug mehrerer Leistungen
3) 2. Halbjahr wegen Beginn der stationären Leistungen ab 1.7.96
Quelle: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit
0
1995 1996 3) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
3) Payment for stationary benefits started only in July 1996.Source: Federal Ministery of Health (2009a)
Figure 4 sho s the distribution of the shares of benefits over the years 1995 to 2006. It is
apparent that the share of cash allowances has remained almost unchanged while the share of
institutional care has increased steadily.
3.3 Service Providers
As mentioned above, benefit claimants opting for cash allowances can purchase services from
any provider. For benefits in kind or institutional care providers have to be contracted with the
SLTCI funds. Eligible for contracts are independent businesses when a person qualified in care
is in charge and liable. The skilled person needs to have at least two years of experience in care
acquired during the last five years. Furthermore, providers have to pay their employees common
regional wages. In addition, all providers have to fulfill quality requirements that are examined
regularly. If providers fulfill these criteria a so-called provision contract (Versorgungsvertrag) is
signed between the service provider and the association of SLTCI funds of the state.
The catalogue of services and the scale of charges for services are defined by governmental
departments in cooperation with all affected parties. Thus, prices of services are not market-
determined but administered. There are regional differences between charges to account for
general wage level and income differences across states.
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All providers are monitored and advised by the Medical Review Board of social health insur-
ance funds. Principles and criterions for qualitative care are composed by all stakeholders of
SLTCI and are examined regularly in intervals of not more than one year.15 In case of a spe-
cial occasion the examination will be conducted more diligently than for a regular evaluation.
Results have to be made available to all stakeholders.
4 Threats and Perspectives for Sustainable LTCI in Germany
In face of an ageing society the demand for long-term care is expected to further increase which
challenges SLTCI. Figure 5 shows the (expected) development of the share of older people
between 1990 and 2020. According to this projection the share of people older than 59 will be
almost one third of the population in 2020 (see Figure 5). Together with a constant or even
decreasing birth rate and a constant or increasing participation rate of women, the need for
professional or institutional care will surely increase.
Figure 5: Share of older people from 1990 to 2020
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share of people >69
share of people >79
share of people >85
1990 1995 2000 2008 2015
>59 16262951 17209362 19412179 20957744 22808500
>69 8070663 8693487 9537072 11584456 13067000
>79 3010809 3294200 3086658 4061112 4789000
>85 1129557 1423854 1612696 1802376 2265000
1990 1995 2000 2008 2015
shar  of people >59 20.39% 21.03% 23.60% 25.56% 28.00%
share of people >69 10.12% 10.63% 11.59% 14.13% 16.04%
share of people >79 3.78% 4.03% 3.75% 4.95% 5.88%
hare of people >85 1.42% 1.74% 1.96% 2.20% 2.78%
79753227 81817499 82259540 82002356 81445500
1990 1995 2000 2008 2015 2020
Data source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (2009b)
4.1 The Role of Informal Care
One reason to prioritize home over institutional care in the German SLTCI is the idea of
solidarity and the family ideal. Home care should enable a person in need of care to maintain
a self-determined living in the home environment. Besides, family members, relatives or other
persons usually provide more than just “technical help” but beyond that give emotional care.
Of course, there are also threats from informal care. Although the situation of the person in
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need of care is assessed regularly, quality of informal care can be inferior to professional care.
Furthermore, the relationship between carer and patient is close and the fact of dependency
could give opportunity for exercise of power or even negligence in case of overload on the side of
the carer. Go¨rgen, Herbst, and Rabold (2006) find in a survey that about 15% of people in need
of care report acts of disregard of autonomy, disregard of dignity, and negligence in caring.16
Strengthening of home care should be achieved by provision of cash allowances which allow to
reward informal care. As almost 80% of all spending to benefit recipients are cash allowances,
informal home care is currently the predominant way of providing care in Germany. Wasem
(1997) points out why the existing system of benefits in kind and cash allowances strengthens
home care. Benefits in kind enable persons to stay longer at home or to reduce hospital stays
instead of having to rely on stationary care. However, Wasem (1997) further argues that the
prevalence of cash allowances may lead to a situation where the share of professional home
care is low. Of course, benefits in cash can also be used to purchase professional care services.
According to Klie (1998), access to supporting networks is identified as the main determinant
of the choice between benefits in kind and cash allowances.
Infratest Sozialforschung (2003) present an overview on the structure of informal care in
Germany. In a representative survey from 2002 of more than 25,000 households of benefit
recipients of SLTCI and other people in need of care they find that about 92% of all benefit
recipients receive informal care.17 The majority of carers are family members, and 73% are
female. The fact that one third of all informal carers are 65 years and older reveals the large
part of informal care that is provided by the same generation. 69% of all carers are married and
60% are not working. However, about 33% are working more than 15 hours a week. Therefore,
a non-negligible part of carers has to shoulder two tasks. It should be noted, that around two
third of informal carers live in the same house or household and are therefore disposable around
the clock. The average weekly time spent on care amounts to more than 36 hours. According
to Klie (1998), about 50% of all informal carers receive monetary remunerations.
Given the demographic figures, i.e. increasing life expectancy and female participation rates
combined with lower birthrates, there are doubts that the level of care could be maintained by
provision of informal care in the long-run due to the rising number of people in need of care and
the shrinking number of possible carers. Klie (1998) points out that people with a “pre-modern”
lifestyle, i.e. with more children, living with family, living in rural areas, have more often a solid
network available for informal help. In contrast, these solid networks are less likely for people
with modern lifestyle, i.e. individualization, urbanization, and less children. According to the
description in Klie (1998), trends like individualization and urbanization have more effects on
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the lifestyle of the next generation and this will accelerate the loss of solid networks for future
benefit recipients. This development will reduce the number of (potential) informal carers in
addition to the demographic shift.
4.2 Personnel & Care
Care is very labor intensive and the increase in the number of persons in need of care will
also increase the demand for labor in the future. Felder and Fetzer (2008) point out that the
combination of inelastic demand and limited technical progress will lead to an over-proportional
increase of costs (a so-called Baumol effect). The theoretically derived argument is in line with
the cost increases reported in Kronberger Kreis (2005) of 3.4% yearly for out-patient and of
5.9% for in-patient care.
However, given the growth in expenses and number of benefit recipients SLTC insurers at-
tempt to maintain costs at level or at least to prevent them from increasing further. In part,
saving labor costs is achieved by remuneration of providers for certain bundles of services. By
doing so, the time for single tasks is not accounted separately. The drawback of this approach
is that service providers have the incentive to accomplish the tasks in the shortest time possi-
ble. This leads to a very “technical” way of accomplishing services which has been criticized.18
In line with that, the Council of Health Advisors (2005) reports that professional carers feel
inferior to voluntary carers since the introduction of SLTCI because their engagement is limited
to provide this technical care whereas informal carers seem to be responsible for quality time
spent with the patients. Another aspect of the bundling procedure is that service providers
limit their supply of services to bundles that could be remunerated according to the SLTCI
catalogue of in kind services. As a result, persons who want to use cash allowances to purchase
services that are not covered by benefits in kind may have trouble to find a matching provider
(see also Council of Health Advisors, 2005).
Another way to reduce labor costs and to meet the increasing demand for personnel is to
change the qualification mix of employees. Council of Health Advisors (2001) reports that
for institutional care there has been a reduction in qualification during the time from 1996 to
1999; employees without qualification have increased by factor six from around 1% to about
6%. In addition, skilled employees have been substituted partly by assistants who receive lower
wages. Cost pressure is very high: already in 1997, there were only 31% skilled employees in
institutional care facilities, although a quota of 50% is requested by law.
From 2003 to 2008, the share of skilled nurses in general (for the whole health sector) has
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slightly decreased from 57 to 55%. However, the share of nurses without qualification has
increased from 9 to 15%. For geriatric nurses the same pattern applies: The share of nurses
with a qualification has decreased from 64 to 59%, while the share of those without qualification
has increased from 17 to 23%.19
4.3 Revenues and Expenses
Status Quo
The aim of SLTCI to provide stable real benefits with stable contribution rates is put at risk for
two reasons. First, there will be less revenues as the number of contribution payers will decrease
in future years due to the demographic shift. Second, expenses will increase as high-birthrate
cohorts are the benefit recipients to come in future years and life expectancy is increasing and
with it morbidity of older people.20 Thus, there is a double pressure on the existing financing
mechanism of SLTCI. Furthermore, benefits have not been adapted to price increases in the
time between 1995 and 2008. Hence, according to Council of Economic Advisors (2004) the
continuously shrinking real benefits can be seen as a privilege for the first benefit recipients
shortly after introduction of SLTCI and as a disadvantage for recipients in the period before
2008. Fetzer, Moog, and Raffelhu¨schen (2003) even show that social LTCI is not an inter-
generational contract because no generation balances future receipts with payments.
Projections
A number of authors provide projections on the sustainability of SLTCI in Germany in face
of increased spending, decreased earnings, and, therefore, sinking real benefits. However, all
available analyses are based on the status quo until 2008 and thus do not take account of the
adjustment of benefits introduced thereafter. Nevertheless, the development under a continued
status quo in benefits and contributions is revealed quite consistently from the different pro-
jections. Council of Economic Advisors (2004) and Kronberger Kreis (2005) point out that in
2050 real benefits will account for only about 50% of their value in 1995. For the time between
1995 and 2004, Kronberger Kreis (2005) reports yearly cost increases of 3.4% for out-patient
care and 5.9% for in-patient care. For the projection of real benefits they assume an annual
inflation of 1.5%. Then, if cost increases in the health sector stay on a high level, real benefits
will shrink even faster.
Concerning the number of future benefit recipients, assumptions with respect to the devel-
opment of the population and the risk of being in need of care have to be placed. Differences
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between the available projections therefore refer mainly to differing assumptions concerning the
population development and immigration. Assuming a constant age-specific risk of care de-
pendency, Rothgang (2001) calculates about 2.9 to 3.3 million benefit recipients in 2040. This
would be an increase of 55 - 76% compared to 2000. Similarly, Council of Economic Advisors
(2004) estimates a number of 2.4 to 3.5 million benefit recipients in 2040 when assuming con-
stant age-specific risks of care dependency. Nevertheless, Rothgang (2001) supposes that the
risk of being in need of care will decrease because with increasing life expectancy prevalence also
occurs later in life. Including this change, the estimated number of benefit recipients in 2040
changes to 2.5 to 2.7 million. Blinkert and Gra¨f (2009) likewise analyze scenarios of decreasing
prevalence that result in 3.25 to 3.5 million people in need of care; however, their projection
refers to the year 2050.
Even when maintaining the status quo of benefit payments of the time until 2008, the con-
tribution rates will have to be raised tremendously. According to Herzog Kommission (2003),
contribution rates will amount to (at least) 2.6% of gross earnings subject to social insurance
contributions in 2030. Council of Economic Advisors (2004) expects a further rise up to 2.7 to
4.0% conditional on the underlying assumptions about the growth of benefits and the growth
of revenues. However, despite this significant increase contribution rates will peak in 2055 be-
tween 4.5 to 6.5% (Fetzer, Moog, and Raffelhu¨schen, 2003). Afterwards, the lower-birthrate
cohorts will enter the pool of persons in need of care. Similar results are obtained by projec-
tions by Blinkert and Gra¨f (2009). They estimate a lower boundary for 2050 at 3% when a
decreasing prevalence, a low adjustment of benefit levels and a slowly sinking reserve of informal
carers are assumed. The upper boundary when a constant prevalence and a high adjustment
of benefit levels are assumed amounts to even 7% of gross earnings subject to social insurance
contributions.
Total expenses will increase following Rothgang (2001) by between 84 and 109% depending
on the assumed share of home and institutional care and the expected increase in the number of
benefit recipients. In particular, he assumes the share of professional care to increase mainly due
to the higher number of single households which corresponds to an over-proportional increase
in total spending compared to the increase in the number of benefit recipients.
With regard to a projection of the revenues of SLTCI, Rothgang (2001) points out that a
forecast of future contribution payers and immigrants as well as pensioners is required. On the
one hand, there will be less people working in jobs subject to social insurance contributions due
to the demographic shift, but, on the other hand, there will be more pensioners as well which will
at least partly compensate for the expected loss. In addition, Rothgang (2001) further assumes
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that participation rates will increase due to higher employment chances in the labor force when
the high-birthrate cohorts leave the labor market. Consideration of these effects results in an
expected decrease in revenues between 0 to 17%; the decline will be lowest if adaptations on
the labor market are considered. In addition, Blinkert and Gra¨f (2009) present figures for
the relation of contribution payers and benefit recipients. The ratio in 2007 is 26 persons
contributing for one recipient, but it will deteriorate to only 10 to 16 persons contributing for
one recipient in 2050.
5 Reforming SLTCI: Options and Recent Changes
5.1 Reform Options
The different projections clarify the need to reform the SLTCI. In the following, we will outline a
number of different reform options that have been suggested recently. The range of suggestions
covers concepts which almost resemble the existing pay-as-you-go system as well as concepts
proposing systems with funding principle which should be implemented instantly. The main
aspects of the different reform options are summarized in Table 8 below.
Universal Flat Rate Contribution (Bu¨rgerversicherung)
The universal flat rate contribution system augments the idea of the existing pay-as-you-go
system that only considers employees in jobs subject to social insurance contributions. In
the universal flat rate contribution system, all employed citizens including civil servants and
self-employed persons will be required to contribute to the insurance. Since the so-far not
included professional groups have even higher incomes on average, the revenues of SLTCI will
rise. Nevertheless, the social insurance contributions assessment ceiling should maintain in effect
but in addition tax allowances of capital revenues will be considered.21
Calculations of the corresponding figures of contribution rates for Germany are provided
by Lauterbach, Luengen, Stollenwerk, Gerber, and Klever-Deichert (2005). Compared to the
status quo scenario (contributions before 2008), they calculate 0.36%points lower contribution
rates in the universal flat rate contribution system. When regarding the enlarged population
of contribution payers, the expected increase in contribution rates will be smaller as well with
corresponding estimates of 1.85% in 2025 compared to 2.33% in the status quo scenario. In
addition, Lauterbach, Luengen, Stollenwerk, Gerber, and Klever-Deichert (2005) suggest further
to include people suffering from dementia and to raise benefits for home care (level I to e 704
20
and level II to e 1,100). In this case, contribution rates of the universal flat rate contribution
system would have amounted to 1.88% in 2006 and will rise to 2% in 2025.
Intergenerational Burden Sharing (Intergenerativer Lastenausgleich)
Within the scope of a reform proposal for the whole social insurance system in Germany on be-
half of the that-time government Ru¨rup Kommission (2003) provided a suggestion for reforming
SLTCI. To enable a sustainable level of care provision, they postulated an increase in benefits
for the year 2005 up to e 400 for care level I, e 1,000 for care level II and e 1,500 for care level
III. Moreover, identical benefit levels for home and institutional care are recommended. Ru¨rup
Kommission further proposed an annual adjustment of benefits at a rate of 2.25% assuming an
annual increase of nominal wages by 3% and an inflation rate of 1.5%. To finance this increase
in benefits, higher contribution rates of pensioners should be implemented. In their scenario,
there should be a basic contribution rate at 1.2% of gross earnings for the working population
and pensioners to be introduced in 2010. In addition, pensioners will be required to pay further
2% of their income to compensate the increase in benefits. The working population should
contribute additional 0.5% to the basic contribution rate that should build a stock of capital
paid as a pension, this should enable payment of increased contribution rates during retirement.
Over time, this additional rate should fade out until 2030 while holding the overall contribu-
tion rate fixed at 1.7%. The increase in the basic contribution rate for the working population
should guarantee the stability of the pay-as-you-go system in face of the ageing population.
Only the basic contribution rate should be equally shared between employees and employers
and between pensioners and the pension insurance institutes respectively, the additional parts
of the contribution rate should be deducted from individual’s earnings. Ru¨rup Kommission
(2003) calculated that contribution rates of pensioners will rise to 4.5% in 2040 (the last year
considered in their analysis) and the capital stock accumulated will amount to about e 125
billion. This set-up allows a sustainable funding of SLTCI until 2040 when the demographic
shift is expected to reach its turning point.
Fixed Premia (Umlagefinanziertes Pauschalbeitragssystem)
An alternative approach is recommended by Council of Economic Advisors (2004), where premia
are favored that are independent of individual earnings and can be combined with building
a capital stock. In that sense, the Fixed Premium model is similar to a universal flat rate
benefit system but with lump-sum contributions. Children will be mandatorily insured with
21
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the contribution payer (as in the current system), however, in contrast to the current system
spouses will also be required to pay contributions on their own. The fixed premium should
be adjusted over time to account for increased overall spending on long-term care. Council
of Economic Advisors (2004) suggested an introductory rate at e 25 independently of gender
and age. Depending on increases in earnings, overall inflation and inflation in care services the
fixed rate is expected to rise up to e 50-162 in 2050. It should be noted, that no adjustment of
benefits is considered in this concept, although Council of Economic Advisors (2004) mentions
the necessity to do so. If adjustment of benefits is regarded, premia would be clearly higher.
Moreover, if a funding principle would be considered, contributions will differ by gender and
age.
Premia with Funding Principle (Kapitalgedecktes Pra¨mienmodell)
The so-far presented reform options propose to maintain the pay-as-you-go character of the cur-
rent SLTCI system or to adopt flexible combinations or hybrid systems with funding principle.
In contrast to that, Herzog Kommission (2003) suggests the transition into a capital funded
system in the long-run by fading out the pay-as-you-go components completely. In their pro-
posal, the transition period will last until 2030, and afterwards cohort-dependent fixed premia
will be imposed. During the transition period, there should be a constant contribution rate
of 3.2% of gross earnings subject to social insurance contributions. These higher contribution
rates compared to the existing status quo should be used to build up a collective capital stock
which will subsidize contributions of older people from 2030 onwards. The expected level of
premia for a 20 year old person in 2030 will amount to e 52 per month and will be higher for
older persons. Children and spouses will be mandatorily covered. People who are not able to
account for premia will receive subsidies paid from tax transfers. Herzog Kommission (2003)
suggests to compensate employers by abolition of another paid holiday and further recommends
the adjustments of benefits.
Cohort Model (Kohortenmodell)
Besides the fixed premium model, the Council of Economic Advisors (2004) suggests the transi-
tion to a system with funding principle. In the original proposal, starting in 2005 persons born
after 1951 should drop out of the SLTCI and pay cohort-specific premia in a private long-term
care insurance. Cohorts born before 1951 should remain in the old SLTCI system but will have
to pay fixed premia of e 50 per month that will be adjusted by e 1 annually from 2005 onwards.
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The transition period will last until 2045, then almost every living person will be insured in
the cohort-specific premium system with capital covered insurance. Benefits will remain the
same, but with an increasing number of older people in need of care younger cohorts will be
forced to pay additional contributions for the older cohorts and also for children. With regard to
the expected demographic change, these additional contributions for older cohorts will reduce to
zero in 2045. Again, Council of Economic Advisors (2004) generally recommends the adjustment
of benefits, but no scenarios for adjusted benefits are considered in their calculations.
Phase-Out Model (Auslaufmodell)
Using a method of generation accounting, Ha¨cker and Raffelhu¨schen (2004) calculate that all
living generations are net receivers of SLTCI whereas all future generations will be net con-
tributors. Therefore, the current status quo of the SLTCI includes a sustainability gap (Nach-
haltigkeitslu¨cke) that stems from the difference between the budget restriction and future net
payment flows of all cohorts. Overall, the sustainability gap for all future years amounts to about
50 to 89% of German GDP for the year 2000, where differences occur due to the underlying
assumptions concerning cost pressure for prices of care.
In order to reduce this burden, Ha¨cker and Raffelhu¨schen (2004) suggest a phase-out-model.
In this model, the current pay-as-you-go scheme is slowly converted into a capital covered scheme
with the following characteristics: In 2005, persons younger than 60 will drop out of SLTCI
and instead will contract with a (compulsory) private insurance. Persons 60 years and older
will start to pay a fixed premium of e 50. Benefits will be adjusted at an annual rate of 1.5%
and as older persons’ fixed premia are not sufficient to compensate for benefit payments the
younger cohorts have to pay a solidary contribution of 1.2% of their income. This additional
contribution will rise to 1.7% in 2027 when the high-birthrate cohorts become the risk group of
people in need of care; afterwards, the additional contribution will slightly phase out until 2047.
In this set-up, the sustainability gap reduces to 0 to 4.3% (in terms of German GDP for the year
2000) and the financial situation will be almost balanced. Felder and Fetzer (2008) suggest a
similar model. It only differs with respect to the start of the phasing-out period already in 2007
and that older cohorts will be required to pay increasing income-related contributions instead
of fixed premia.
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Immediate Fully Capital Funded Model (Sofortige Kapitaldeckung)
The most radical reform option is suggested by Kronberger Kreis (2005). They criticize the
other reform options for keeping too many aspects of the existing system or for waiting too
long to introduce a system with funding principle respectively. Particularly, the linkage to wage
and the combination of insurance and redistribution are assessed to be the main fallacies of
the current system. Therefore, they recommend to switch to a fully capital covered system
with risk-adjusted premia. A transition period as proposed by Council of Economic Advisors
(2004) and Ha¨cker and Raffelhu¨schen (2004) is assessed to be too costly and for the same
reason contributions paid so far should not be refunded. Furthermore, Kronberger Kreis (2005)
recommends to combine health insurance and LTC insurance.
This compulsory private health and long-term insurance should be based on the cost-of-
service principle, so that every insured person approximately pays for possible future benefits
according to the inherent risk. Only basic coverage should be guaranteed by the compulsory part
of the insurance, but further protection will be voluntarily available. Premia should not exceed
e 50 per month in the beginning and the accumulated stock of savings should be completely
transferable in case the insured person changes the insurer. Every person in need of care will
have to pay an excess for benefits received. Kronberger Kreis (2005) suggests to offset benefits
with state transfers when older persons’ benefits surpass their contributions with premia. This
compensation will be up to the full level of benefits in the old pay-as-you-go scheme in the first
year and will decrease with every additional year after the reform. It will end in the 11th year
after introduction of the capital covered private insurance. For persons not able to afford the
private insurance, subsidies from tax transfers should be provided.
5.2 The reform of SLTCI in 2008
Despite the variety of proposals for reforming long-term care insurance, a reform law of long-
term care (Pflegeweiterentwicklungsgesetz ) was adopted in 2008 changing a number of important
aspects.22 First of all, according to the recommendations and postulation of several advisors,
e.g. Herzog Kommission (2003), Rothgang (2008), Ru¨rup Kommission (2003), Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors (2004), Ha¨cker and Raffelhu¨schen (2004), Council of Health Advisors (2005),
an adjustment of benefits was introduced. In addition, the required contribution period for
eligibility of benefit receipt was reduced from five to two years. With regard to respite care, the
minimum duration until entitlement was reduced from 12 to six months.
Since benefits were not adjusted to inflation during 1995 to 2008, real benefits were shrinking.
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In the course of the reform benefits will be raised in three steps in 2008, 2010 and 2012. To
prevent real benefits from decreasing again, payments will be adjusted from 2015 onwards. Every
three years, the required amount of adjustment will be assessed.23 According to the respective
law, raises will be oriented towards the cumulative inflation of the last three years but must not
exceed the increase of gross incomes. Rothgang (2008) criticizes that no rule-based procedure
for the adjustment of benefits was implemented. Linking the adjustment of benefits to regular
examination of whether this is required carries with it the danger not to guarantee constant real
values of benefits over time. The sole change adopted to increase revenues of SLTCI to finance
the adjustment of benefits is the increase of contribution rates by 0.25%points. Rothgang (2008)
notes that the obtained additional revenues will be only sufficient to finance the raise of benefits
until 2012, and, therefore, do not provide a means for the targeted adjustment of benefits
starting afterwards. He calculates that if increases in benefits will be spread proportionally
over the years 1996-2015, there has to be an additional annual increase of 0.4%. Hence, the
adopted benefit increases will mitigate the loss of real value of benefits, but are still not able
to compensate for it. Furthermore, Klie (2008) criticizes that funding has not been detached
from being solely based on labor earnings. All reform proposals described above recommend
an enlargement of the basis of contributors or even to introduce (partly) capital coverage. The
recent reform therefore provides only a continued status quo. Given the unchanged risks SLTCI
faces, another increase in contributions has to be expected soon or, put differently, another
fundamental debate about reforming the funding system in general.
Second, the group of people eligible for benefits was augmented by people suffering from
dementia or other psychic impairments, even if no care level is assessed. This inclusion has
also been postulated by a number of advisors, e.g. Lauterbach, Luengen, Stollenwerk, Gerber,
and Klever-Deichert (2005), Ru¨rup Kommission (2003), or Council of Health Advisors (2005).
However, despite this inclusion a reformed definition of who is in need of care is missing in the
reform. Therefore, asymmetries in the eligibility criteria are imposed. According to Klie (2008)
the major reason for the delay in providing a general definition of “being in need of care” is
that especially restraints from psychic diseases are difficult to integrate into a notion that is by
now largely orientated towards somatic concepts.
Third, in order to improve the quality and sustainability of home care, so-called care sta-
tions (Pflegestu¨tzpunkte) are established that provide an intensified counseling for the benefit
claimants and their carers. In addition, regular quality controls will be conducted at least an-
nually starting in 2011. However, Igl and Naegele (2008) criticize these innovations as being
too much concentrated on infrastructure. In addition, in their opinion federal institutions take
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over a too large part of organization of care, a responsibility essentially originated at the federal
states and municipalities.
Fourth, relatives of persons in need of care are entitled to a leave scheme that guarantees
continued social insurance, and incentives for voluntary commitment should be raised. The
implemented leave scheme and contributions to social insurances can provide appropriate mea-
sures, but it remains an open question whether it will prove effective to reach the intended
goal.
Moreover, it is now possible for groups of people in need of care to pool benefits and to use
saved expenses for supplementary services. Further measures adopted in the new law comprise
a reduction of the processing time for applications, an improvement in the cooperation between
institutional care providers and medical assistance, and an increase in the number of certified
professional carers. Finally, incentives to apply for prevention measures are expanded.
6 Summary
This paper has provided an overview of the German SLTCI system. In the current state,
Germany provides a universal, non means-tested contribution-financed social insurance for long-
term care. This insurance should partially cover the care needs of the benefit claimants. Similar
to the other social insurances in Germany, it is organized as a pay-as-you-go system. The benefit
scheme allows for some flexibility in the provision of services due to recognition of different levels
of care dependency and different types of benefits available including cash allowances on the
one hand and support for institutional care on the other hand. In the current situation, most
claimants apply for cash allowances that should enable to maintain home care arrangements
with the help of informal carers.
The ageing of society will increase the number of persons in care dependency and will re-
duce the number of potential informal carers. Both developments challenge the sustainability
of German SLTCI. Therefore, a number of reform options have been suggested by several au-
thors. Some of these reform options suggest to only slightly adjusting the status quo system
to take account of the changed demands, whereas other proposals postulate a radical reform of
abolishing the pay-as-you-go system in favor of a system with funding principle. Despite the
availability of options and the concerns about the status quo, the German legislator introduced
a first reform of the SLTCI system in 2008. Although remarkable innovations were adopted,
like the nominal adjustment of benefits to maintain constant real values, the reform has to be
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criticized as being non-sustainable already in the medium-run. Therefore, further reforms will
be necessary in the near future.
Notes
1See §1, subparagraph 1.
2Countries that have opted for direct service provision on a tax basis often also have their health care system
financed by taxes (thus, institutional resources play a crucial role for the choice). According to OECD (2005)
countries with contribution financed long-term care provision are Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
(partly) Switzerland (differs across cantons), and partly in the United Stated of America. Tax based systems are
implemented in Scandinavia, but also in Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and also partly in the
USA.
3See Go¨tting, Haug, and Hinrichs (1994) and Meyer (1996) for an extended discussion with regard to the
arguments and timeline of the debate of the different parties and interest groups involved.
4Some minor exceptions should be noted. Unemployment insurance contributions consist of employer’s and
employee’s contributions and a third item, contributions for the promotion of job creation. Those are not shared
on a basis of parity in all cases.
5SLTCI funds are public cooperations. Some of the larger insurers like the public community insurances (AOK,
Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen) or the company health insurances (BKK, Betriebskrankenkassen) are organized
on the level of federal states.
6 See Social Security Code XI § 9 (SGB XI, Sozialgesetzbuch XI ).
7This adjustment became necessary due to a judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court in April 2001 and
was enclosed in the so-called “children consideration law” (Kinderberu¨cksichtigungsgesetz ).
8Herzog Kommission (2003) notes that renouncement of a paid public holiday is equal to 0.5 contribution rate
points.
9Employees from Saxony put forward an institutional complaint that their additional contribution overcom-
pensates an extra holiday. However, The Federal Constitutional Court decided that a calculated “compensation
gap” of e 40 (for average salary) was bearable and was not an obstacle to the principle of non-discrimination.
10The surplus in 2006 was due to the shift of contribution payments to the end of a month. SLTCI funds took
13 payments in 2006 instead of 12.
11See SGB XI §14a.
12The maximum grants are e 133.73 (113.30) for care level I, e 267.46 (226.59) for care level II and e 401.18
(339.89) for care level III. Values in brackets apply to East Germany.
13Maximum grants for unemployment insurance are e 7.06 (5.98) (term in brackets applies to East Germany),
e 130.20 for health insurance and e 16.38 for SLTCI.
14Before the reform there was also the possibility to obtain some benefits (maximum e 460 per year) but there
was no clear-cut definition of eligible persons.
15Quality assessment was introduced with the reform in 2008. Until 2010 one examination has to take place
for every service provider and from 2011 on regular examination starts.
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16The sample is not representative as only those who were able to answer the questions are subject to the
survey. However, the study provides at least a qualitative hint that this hazard might exist.
17Similar results are obtained by other studies for Germany. For example, with regard to the Freiburger
Pflegestudie Klie (1998) mentions that 87 % of all help is provided through informal care.
18The Ministry of Health has commissioned research for a new definition of being in need of care and suggestions
for new ways how to implement a more holistic care.
19Figures are taken from the Federal Bureau of Statistics (2008). Unqualified employees comprise those who
have not started an apprenticeship training or do not possess a university degree.
20Medical progress has restricted mortality more than morbidity. People get older but often are of poor health
in their last years, see Kronberger Kreis (2005).
21For the reform of health insurance rental incomes should also be considered for deductions.
22Further details on the major changes are provided by Federal Ministery of Health (2008).
23The federal government will examine the need for adjustment of care benefits for the first time in 2014.
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